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Introduction
On June 28, 2007, a sharply
sharply divided United States
Supreme
invalidated student assignment
Supreme Court
Court invalidated
assignment plans
plans in Seattle,
Washington
Washington and Louisville, Kentucky
Kentucky that were designed
designed to
promote racial diversity and to address
address racial isolation
isolation in K-12
K-12
education.
5-to-4 vote in Parents
Parents Involved in Community
Community
education. By a 5-to-4
Schools v. Seattle School District
McFarlandv.
District No.
No. II and McFarland
v. Jefferson
Education, the Court struck down voluntary
County Board
Board of Education,
integration
standard applied to
integration plans under the "strict scrutiny" standard
race-conscious policies challenged
race-conscious
challenged under the Equal Protection
Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment, and ruled that the plans
were
to the interests
were not narrowly
narrowly tailored to
interests asserted by the school

districts.'1
districts.
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El
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SantaClara
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California
Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard
Harvard Law
School (September 2007).
1.
1.

S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
127 S.
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The Supreme
Involvedin
Community
Supreme Court's ruling in Parents
Parents Involved
in Community
Schools is disappointing
disappointing and troubling for a number
number of reasons.
First, the ruling significantly
significantly limits the use of race by school
districts voluntarily seeking
seeking to integrate their schools, at a time
when racial
resegregation are increasing nationwide.
racial isolation and resegregation
Second, when viewed
viewed in the context of the Court's landmark
Second,
decision in Brown v.
Board ofEducation,
v. Board
Education, the ruling marks a sharp
turn in the Court's historical commitment
commitment to addressing racial
segregation
segregation in public schools. Third, the ruling sends a strong
signal that a majority
majority of the Court's current
current membership is highly
skeptical of race-conscious
race-conscious policies designed to promote
promote equality
and the integration of public institutions. Indeed, four members
of the Court, including its two newest members, appear
appear ready to
strike down any deployment of race designed to advance
advance equal
opportunity.
Nevertheless, because of the voting alignment
alignment of
Nevertheless,
the Justices in these cases and the limits of the Court's
rulings, school districts retain the ability to employ race-conscious
measures designed
designed to integrate
integrate their schools.
schools. Five of the Justices
endorsed the compelling interests
interests in reducing racial isolation and
and
educational diversity in elementary
elementary and secondary
in promoting educational
schools, and the opinions of those Justices
Justices provide guidance on
how school districts might proceed in designing
designing constitutionally
permissible policies. Moreover, the Supreme Court as a whole
made clear that Grutter
Grutter v.v. Bollinger,
Bollinger, its 2003 ruling upholding
upholding the
use of race to promote
promote student body diversity
diversity in higher education,
is good law.
This paper examines the Seattle and Louisville cases
cases and
and
discusses their impact on K-12 education
education and constitutional
doctrine.
is divided
divided into three parts. Part I examines
doctrine. The
The analysis
analysis is
the
in Parents
Parents Involved
in Community
Community Schools
Schools
the Justices'
Justices' opinions
opinions in
Involved in
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and discusses the constitutional
boundaries for voluntary raceconstitutional boundaries
conscious integration policies
policies established by the Court. Part II
II
conscious
implications ofthe cases in creating and implementing
discusses the implications
K-12 policies designed to avoid racial isolation
isolation and to promote
educational
educational diversity. Part III assesses the impact of the cases on
on
equal protection doctrine and race-conscious
race-conscious policy making more
generally.

Conscious
L The Constitutional Limits
Limits ofRaceofRace-Conscious
Integration Policies: Understanding the Parents
Parents
Involved in Community Schools
Involved
Schools Opinions
Because the voting alignment
alignment and reasoning of the Justices in
Parents
Parents Involved in Community Schools are critical in determining
determining
constitutional principles, it is necessary
necessary to examine
examine
controlling constitutional
the Justices' separate
separate opinions and to analyze
analyze how the opinions
2
2
interrelate. Justice
John
Justice Anthony Kennedy
Kennedy joined Chief Justice John
G. Roberts,
and
Roberts, along with Justices
Justices Samuel Alito, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas, to form the five-member
five-member majority to strike
down the Seattle and Louisville plans. However, Justice Kennedy
did not join key passages of Chief Justice Roberts' plurality
disagreed
opinion and made clear in his opinion that he flatly disagreed
with important elements of the plurality's reasoning. In addition,
a different majority of the Justices, composed of Justice Kennedy
and dissenting Justices Stephen
Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
2. Chief
Justice Roberts announced
ChiefJustice
announced the judgment
judgment of the Court and his opinion was joined in full by Justices
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas. Justice
Justice Kennedy
concurred in the judgment
Chief
concurred
judgment and joined Parts I, II, III-A, and III-C of Chief
Justice Roberts'
Roberts' four-part plurality
plurality opinion. Justice Thomas issued a separate
concurring opinion. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens, issued a dissenting opinion. Justice Stevens also issued a dissenting
opinion.
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David Souter, and John Paul Stevens, endorsed the school
districts' compelling
compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation and in
promoting
promoting diversity, and thus have provided bases for educational
race-conscious policies in the future and
policy makers to
to employ race-conscious
still comply with the Equal
Equal Protection Clause.

A. Chief
ChiefJustice
Justice Roberts' Opinion
Opinion
Justice
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy joined Parts I, II, III-A and III-C of Chief
Chief
in
Parents Involved in
Justice Roberts'
Roberts' four-part plurality opinion in Parents
Community Schools;
Schools; these parts of the Roberts'
Roberts' opinion constitute
a formal opinion of the Court. Part I of the Roberts' opinion
discusses
procedural context
context of the two cases and
discusses the factual and procedural
examines
Louisville plans.'
plans. 3
examines the basic mechanics
mechanics of the Seattle and Louisville
Part II addresses
addresses a threshold issue involving whether
whether the Court
had jurisdiction
of
jurisdiction in the Seattle
Seattle case because of the plaintiffs' lack of
standing to sue; the Court concluded
concluded that it did have jurisdiction.44
standing
Part III-A
111-A discusses the standard of review and the applicability
of the Court's prior ruling in Grutter
Grutter v.
v. Bollinger.
Bollinger. 5 Part III-C
focuses on the question of whether the Seattle and Louisville
plans are narrowly tailored and provides
Court's
provides reasoning
reasoning for the Court's
invalidation
invalidation of the two plans.66
Parts III-B and IV of the Roberts opinion examine the school
districts' justifications
justifications for their policies and contain
contain arguments
to counter the dissenting opinions of Justice Breyer
designed to
Breyer
and Justice Stevens. While they do not reflect an opinion of the
Court, these parts of the Roberts
Roberts opinion are significant
significant because
3.
4.

S. Ct. at 2746-50.
127 S.
Id.
Id. at 2750-51.
2750-51.

5.

Id.
Ido at 2751-54.

6.
60

Id.
!do at 2759-61.
2759-61.
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the
they stand in stark contrast to Justice Kennedy's reasoning in the
cases, and,
and, as discussed below, contain startling interpretations of
cases,
Brown v.v. Board
Board of Education
Education and equal protection jurisprudence
Brown
that mark
mark an
an extreme
extreme departure from longstanding
longstanding interpretations
that
of the Constitution.

1. Opinion
Opinion of the Court
1.
Parts III-A
II-A and
and III-C
II-C of
of the
the Roberts
Roberts opinion are central to
to
Parts
the
Court's holding
holding in Parents
Parents Involved in Community Schools.
Schools.
the Court's
Part
11-A confirms that the standard of review in evaluating
evaluating
Part III-A
student assignment
is
classifY on the basis of race is
student
assignment policies that classify
strict scrutiny, the
the most exacting standard
standard of review used by the
strict
courts to
evaluate policies under the Equal Protection
courts
to evaluate
Protection Clause.
Under strict
scrutiny, the
the courts
courts ask two questions to assess the
Under
strict scrutiny,
ends and
that underlie a race-conscious
race-conscious policy: (1)
and the
the means
means that
(1)
ends
Is the
the goal
goal of
the policy
policy sufficiently important to
Is
of the
to constitute a
compelling governmental
governmental interest? and (2)
(2) is
is the policy narrowly
compelling
tailored to
compelling interest? A negative answer to either of
tailored
to that compelling
these
invalidates a race-conscious
policy. Although the
these inquiries
inquiries invalidates
race-conscious policy.
Roberts
Roberts opinion
opinion recognized
recognized that context matters in strict scrutiny,
scrutiny,?7
the
not adjust
adjust or relax its strict scrutiny inquiries;
the majority
majority did
did not
nor
the majority
did the
deference to the school districts
nor did
majority extend
extend any deference
because
of the
the K12 educational
educational context
because of
K-12
context or because the plans were
designed to
to promote
promote integration
integration and not to subordinate racial
designed
minority
group members.
members.
minority group

7.

Id.
!d. at
at 2754.
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a. Compelling
Compelling Interest
Interest
a.
The Court concluded
concluded in Part I1-A
III-A of the Roberts opinion
that the interests asserted by the school districts to justify their
race-conscious policies are distinct from two interests that the
race-conscious
compelling: (1)
(1) remedying the
Court previously recognized as compelling:
present
present effects of past discrimination, and (2) promoting student
student
body diversity in higher education. Arguing
Arguing that an interest in
remedying
remedying past discrimination was not applicable to the Seattle
and Louisville cases, the Court emphasized
emphasized the distinction between
between
de jure segregation
of
segregation arising through the intentional separation
separation of
students by force of law from de facto segregation
segregation in which racial
isolation results from other factors, such as residential housing
patterns
private-sector discrimination. The Louisville schools,
patterns and private-sector
the majority argued, had been released in 2000 from a longstanding
court order to desegregate their schools. The majority further
argued
argued that the Seattle schools had never been "segregated by law"
and were not subject to a desegregation
desegregation decree, notwithstanding
extensive
discrimination in local housing and other
extensive evidence
evidence of discrimination
factors affecting
of
affecting student enrollment, as well as a memorandum of
agreement
agreement between the school
school district and the federal Office for
Civil Rights to desegregate
desegregate the schools.88

8.
at 2752.
2752. The
The Court
Court also dismissed, as dicta, key language from the
8. See
See id.
id. at
Court's
1971
decision
in
Swann v.v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Court's 1971 decision
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board
Board of Education,
Education,
which
would
suggest
that
school
districts
could
employ
race-conscious
which
suggest
race-conscious measures
the absence
absence of
jure segregation and a court order.
Id. at n.10. That
sures in
in the
of de
de jure
order.Id.
language
states: "School
are traditionally
traditionally charged
language states:
"School authorities
authorities are
charged with broad power
power
to
formulate
and
implement
educational
policy
and
might
well
conclude,
for
to formulate and implement
example,
that
in
order
to
prepare
students
to
live
in
a
pluralistic
society
each
example, that in order to prepare students
school should
should have
have aa prescribed
prescribed ratio
Negro to
white students
students reflecting
reflecting
school
ratio of
of Negro
to white
the
for the
as aa whole.
whole. To
To do
do this
this as
as an
an educational
educational policy
the proportion
proportion for
the district
district as
is
within the
is within
the broad
broad discretionary
discretionary powers of school
school authorities ...." Swann
Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd.
of
Educ.,
402
U.S.
1,
16
(1971).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg
(1971).

HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 302 2008-2009

VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION
INTEGRATION POLICIES
POLICIES
VOLUNTARYSCHOOL

2008
2008

303

majority's analysis
analysis also distinguished
distinguished an educational
educational
The majority's
diversity interest
interest in
in higher
higher education
education recognized
recognized in Grutter-Grutterdiversity
race was
was but one
one dimension
dimension of aa broader
broader student
student body
body
where race
diversity-from a racial
racial diversity interest used
used to justify
justifY the
diversity-from
school districts' student assignment
assignment plans:
plans: "The Court in Grutter
Grutter
school
expressly articulated
articulated key limitations
limitations on its holding-defining
holding-defining
expressly
specific type of broad-based
broad-based diversity
diversity and
and noting
noting the
the unique
a specific
context of higher
higher education
."9 The Court then declared
declared
education . .. .. ."'
context
linkages between
between K-12 education
education
that, despite the parallels
parallels and linkages
governed by
by
and higher education,
education, "[t]he
"[t]he present
present cases are not governed
1
Grutter."!Oo
Grutter."

Because
Because of this turn in logic, among other reasons, neither
neither
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy nor the dissenting Justices
Justices agreed with
with the
plurality's subsequent
subsequent conclusions
conclusions that Grutter
Grutter provided
provided no
no
Chief
support for the school districts' asserted interests.
interests. The Chief
Grutter is indeed inconsistent
Justice's reading
reading of Grutter
inconsistent with key
key
stressed
Grutter opinion
opinion itself,
itself, where the Court stressed
language in the Grutter
educational system:
throughout the educational
the importance
importance of diversity throughout
in upholding the compelling interest in higher education
education
diversity, the Grutter
diversity,
Grutter opinion states
states that the Court has "repeatedly
"repeatedly
acknowledged the overriding
acknowledged
overriding importance of preparing students
for work and citizenship, describing
describing education as pivotal
pivotal to
to
'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental
'sustaining our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental
society."'1
role in maintaining the fabric of society."!!
Chief
Because
Because of Justice Kennedy's basic disagreement
disagreement with Chief
interest
Justice Roberts' analysis of the school districts' compelling interest
111-B of the Roberts opinion), there
arguments (contained in Part III-B
at 2754.
S. Ct. at
9. Parents
ParentsInvolved in Cmty Sch.,127 S.
9.
10.
10.

Id,
Id

Plyer v.
v. Doe, 457
457
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) (citing PIyer
11. Grutter v.
11.
U.S. 202 (1982)).
(1982)).
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is no holding from the Court addressing whether
whether the school
districts' interests in promoting racial diversity and in avoiding
racial
racial isolation are compelling. Nor is there a holding by the
Court that these interests are not compelling. Instead, the Court's
invalidation
invalidation of the Seattle and Louisville plans turns on the narrow
scrutiny.
tailoring prong of strict scrutiny.

b. Narrow
Narrow Tailoring
Tailoring
The Supreme
Supreme Court has not established a fixed test for
narrow tailoring, but in assessing whether
whether a race-conscious
policy is narrowly tailored, the Court typically looks at an array
of factors, such as whether a policy is necessary to achieve an
an
asserted
sufficiently flexible, whether it unduly
asserted goal, whether it is sufficiently
burdens
been
burdens non-minorities,
non-minorities, whether
whether race-neutral
race-neutral policies
policies have been
considered
alternatives, and whether time limits or periodic
considered as alternatives,
reviews lead to a logical endpoint for the policy.12
111-C of
of
12 In Part III-C
the Roberts opinion, the majority concludes in summary fashion
that the Seattle and Louisville plans are not narrowly tailored for
two reasons: first, employing race in student assignments was not
not
necessary
to
achieve
the goal of racial diversity, and second, the
necessary
school districts failed to show that they had considered adequate
race-neutral
race-neutral alternatives.

and Louisville Plans
i.i. The Seattle and
Plans
Both
Both school districts operated "controlled choice" policies
that employed race as one of multiple factors in deciding whether
aa student
student might
different
might be assigned to a particular
particular school; in different
12. See
Grutter,539
U.S. at
334-43; United
United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149
12.
See Grutter,
539 U.S.
at 334-43;
149
(1987).
(1987).
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ways, the plans managed
managed student assignments consistent with
13
Under
Under
district-wide demographics
demographics and broad numerical goals. 13
the Seattle plan, entering high school students were given a choice
rank
to
to attend any three of the district's ten high schools and to rank
them in order of preference. If there were more students who
ranked a particular high school first than there were available
"tiebreakers"
spaces at the school, the district employed a series of "tiebreakers"
to that school.
to determine
determine whether a student would be assigned to
to students with
preference was given to
Under an initial tiebreaker, a preference
oversubscribed school. Students were then
a sibling attending an oversubscribed
geographic proximity to the school, unless
assigned based on their geographic
composition
imbalanced-i.e., the racial composition
the school was racially imbalanced-i.e.,
of the school's
school's student body differed from the district's average by
by
14
14
points.
more than fifteen percentage
percentage pointS.
Under the Louisville
Louisville plan, which evolved from a courtordered
1975 to
to 2000 to
to
ordered plan that had been in place from 1975
desegregate
desegregate the Louisville
Louisville schools,
schools, the district employed
employed a broad
enrollment
guideline
guideline that every school should seek a black student enrollment
to 50 percent.
percent.'155 The guideline was
ranging from 15 percent
percent to
evaluate requests for transfers from students'
employed
employed to
to evaluate
students' "resides"
13.
13. The details of the Seattle and Louisville
Louisville plans
plans are beyond the scope of this
Paper. An extensive history and analysis
analysis of the plans are contained
contained in Justice
analysis
is contained
a
more
abbreviated
opinion,
while
Breyer's
dissenting
Breyer's dissenting
abbreviated
contained in
127
ParentsInvolved in Cmty. Sch.,
Justice Roberts' plurality
Chief
Sch., 127
ChiefJustice
plurality opinion. See Parents
S.
S. Ct. 2738 (2007).

14. In 2001-02, the most recent
recent year that the plan was employed, approximately 60%
60% of the district's roughly 46,000 students
students were non-white and apof
residential
segregation,
white.
Because
proximately 40% were
proximately
Because
segregation, over 75% of
of
the district's minority students live in the southern
southern half of the city, and approximately two-thirds of the white students live in the northern
northern half of the city.
15. During the 2003-04 school year, the Jefferson County Public Schools en34% were black
black
approximately 34%
rolled approximately
approximately 97,000 students, of which approximately
in
ParentsInvolved in
and 66%
66% were "other"
"other" (almost all of whom were
were white). See Parents
Cmty.
Cmty. Sch.,
Sch., 127
127 S. Ct. at 2749.
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schools-i.e., schools
schools to
to which students
schools-i.e.,
students were initially
initially assigned
based on
on geographic residence.
residence. When
'When employed,
employed, race
based
race could
could "tip
"tip
the balance"
balance" after residence,
residence, choice, and all
all other factors had
had
part in assessing
assessing the transfer request.
played aa part

ii. Necessity
Necessity of
ofthe
the Plans
Plans
ii.
The majority concluded in
in Part
Part III-C
111-C of the Roberts opinion
that the use of race had only minimal effects on student assignments
in the
the districts, suggesting that the plans were not a necessity and
in
therefore alternative policies would be more effective. The majority
found that in the Seattle school district, 307 student assignments
were affected by the racial tiebreaker during the 2000-01 school
year; the use of race made no difference in over one-third of the
assignments
assignments affected
affected by the racial tiebreaker; and only 52 students
were adversely
adversely affected
assigned
were
affected by the tiebreaker, in that they were assigned
to a school that had not been listed as a preference
preference and to which
16
they would not have been otherwise
otherwise assigned.16
The
The majority
majority further
further found that elementary
elementary school
school students
in
the
III the Louisville
Louisville schools
schools had
had been
been assigned
assigned to their first- or
or
second-choice
transfers,
second-choice school
school 95 percent
percent of the time; that transfers,
which
percent of
of the assignments,
assignments, were
were denied
denied
which constituted
constituted five percent
only
35
percent
of
the
time;
time; and that
that presumably
presumably an
an even
even smaller
smaller
only 35 percent of
17
percentage
percentage were
were denied
denied on
on the basis of the
the racial
racial guidelines.
guidelinesY
The
noted that
that the
the racial
racial guidelines
guidelines would
would only
The majority
majority then
then noted
account
of assignments.
assignments. The
The majority
majority went
went on
on
account for
for three
three percent
percent of
to
not suggest
suggest that
that greater
greater use
use of
of race
race
to conclude:
conclude: "While
"While we
we do
do not
would
of the
the districts'
districts' racial
racial
would be
be preferable,
preferable, the
the minimal
minimal impact
impact of
classifications
on
school
enrollment
casts
doubt
on the
the necessity
necessity
classifications on school enrollment casts doubt on
16.
16. Id.
!d. at
at 2796.
2796.
17.
17. Id.
Id. at
at 2760.
2760.
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18 In contrast, the majority
of using racial classifications."
classifications."18
majority added,
the consideration
consideration of race upheld in Grutter
Grutter "was viewed as
indispensable in more than tripling minority representation
indispensable
representation at the
Michigan] law school-from
school-from 4 to 14.5%."19
[University
[University of Michigan]
14.5%."19

The majority's discussion of the necessity
necessity of the plans IS
is
brief.
brief. There is no analysis of alternative policies, nor does the
majority recognize
recognize the actual effects of the plans on promoting
promoting
diversity
Language accompanying
diversity and preventing
preventing racial isolation. Language
the Court's necessity
particularly telling, however, and
and
necessity analysis is particularly
seems consistent with the plurality's predisposition
predisposition to strike down
any race-based
classification and assignment
race-based classification
assignment system: "Classifying
and assigning
schoolchildren according
according to a binary conception
assigning schoolchildren
conception
of race is an extreme approach
approach in light of our precedents
precedents and our
Nation's history of using race in public
public schools, and requires more
20
to
end to justify
than such an amorphous end
justify it."
it."20

In concluding that neither of the policies was a necessity, the
Court's analysis also reveals a tension in its narrow tailoring
inquiry. In order to comply with prior case law and to avoid other
other
inquiry.
narrow tailoring concerns,
concerns, the plans intentionally
intentionally limited race as
a factor in student assignments. The relatively mild uses of race
employed by the districts were designed
designed to prevent problems
sufficient to
of inflexibility
inflexibility or undue burden, but were not sufficient
satisfy the Court's inquiry into necessity. Ironically, the districts
were penalized
penalized for not using race enough to make a sufficiently
sufficiently
meaningful
meaningful difference in student enrollments.

18.
19.
20.

Id.
original).
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
!d.
Id.
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iii.
Alternatives
iii. Race-Neutral
Race-NeutralAlternatives
In addition to relying on necessity
necessity grounds to invalidate
the plans, the majority concluded in Part III-C
111-C that the districts
engaged
failed to satisfy narrow tailoring because they had not engaged
in "serious, good faith consideration of workable race-neutral
21 The majority ruled that the Seattle school
alternatives.1
alternatives."21
school district
district
had rejected
alternative assignment plans with little or
or
rejected several alternative
no consideration-although
consideration-although Chief Justice Roberts provides
no discussion
rejected those
discussion of why the district might have rejected
alternatives
to the challenged
challenged plans.
alternatives as less effective or inferior to
The majority further ruled that the Louisville
Louisville school district had
evidence that it had considered race-neutral
failed to present evidence
alternatives
court-ordered desegregation
desegregation
alternatives at all. The long history of court-ordered
in the Louisville schools, which extended
extended over 25 years from
from
to 2000, appeared to play no role in ChiefJustice
Chief Justice Roberts'
1975 to

consideration
alternative policies.
consideration of the need for alternative

2. Parts
and IV
IV ofthe Roberts
Roberts Opinion
Opinion
2.
Parts III-B and
Although he voted to strike down the Seattle and Louisville
plans on narrow tailoring grounds, Justice
Justice Kennedy declined to
join Part III-B of
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion, which focuses on
ofChiefJustice
on
the compelling interests of the school districts. Justice Kennedy
Kennedy
also declined to join Part IV of the Roberts
Roberts opinion, which, in
addressing
addressing the dissents' central criticisms, contains
contains remarkable

language
Board of Education
Education
language that attempts to recast Brown v.v. Board
and other leading
leading equal protection cases. Neither Part III-B nor
Part IV form part of the opinion of the Court, but they deserve
serious attention because
Chief Justice
because of the extremity of many of ChiefJustice
21.
21.

Id.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 339).
!d. (quoting Grutter,
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Roberts' arguments. They also reflect the views of the Court's two
newest members, the Chief Justice and Justice Alito.

a. Part
PartIll-B
a.
JJJ-B
In Part III-B of the Roberts opinion, the plurality addresses
the school districts' interests in promoting
and
promoting racial diversity and
in avoiding racial isolation and resegregation.
resegregation. After
Mter decoupling
Grutter and the diversity interest in higher
Grutter
higher education
education from the
K-12 educational context, Chief
Chief Justice Roberts
Roberts does not address
the question of whether
whether the school districts' interests achieve
the educational
to flow from racial
educational and social benefits
benefits asserted to
diversity. Instead, the Chief Justice's opinion recharacterizes
recharacterizes
the school districts' asserted interests as "racial balancing." His
directed
opinion states: "In design and operation, the plans are directed
only to racial balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court
has repeatedly condemned as illegitimate.
The plans are tied to
illegitimate. The
to
demographics, rather than to
each district's specific
specific racial demographics,
to any
pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the
22 The Chief Justice's opinion goes
asserted
asserted educational benefits.
benefits."22
on to criticize the districts for not offering sufficient
sufficient evidence to
explain why the level of racial diversity to
to achieve the asserted
asserted
educational benefits
benefits necessarily
necessarily coincided
coincided with the racial
demographics of each
demographics
each district.

Regardless
Regardless of the strength or appropriateness
appropriateness of the
Chief
demographic evidence
evidence introduced
introduced by the districts, the Chief
Justice's rhetorical use of the term "racial balancing" effectively
effectively
severs any meaningful
meaningful connection
connection between
between the use of racial
demographics and the districts' goals of attaining the benefits of
demographics
of
diversity and of avoiding the harms of racial isolation. Once the
22.

Id.
at 2755.
!d. at
2755.
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recharacterized as interests in numerical
districts' interests were recharacterized

balancing
balancing and racial proportionality, the plurality
plurality invalidated
invalidated
the districts' interests because of language
language in prior Supreme
opinions proposing that "'outright racial balancing'
balancing' is
Court opinions
' '23 Chief
'patently
unconstitutional.
Justice Roberts thus argued
'patently unconstitutional."'23 Chief Justice
that "[a]ccepting
"[a]ccepting racial balancing
balancing as a compelling
compelling state interest
interest
throughout
would justify the imposition of racial proportionality
proportionality throughout
24
society.
American society."24
But, as Justice
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer emphasize in
their opinions, the interests of the school districts are not merely
merely
designed
designed to promote
promote racial proportionality
proportionality for proportionality's
sake. Instead, they are tied to
to preventing
concrete harms associated
preventing concrete
with segregated
concrete educational
segregated schools and to promoting concrete
benefits associated with diverse student bodies. The Roberts
plurality
plurality makes short shrift of the long history of legal precedents
dating back to Brown v.v. Board
Education, where the federal
Board of Education,
courts imposed strong remedies to address the extensive harms
of racially segregated schools. Moreover, the plurality
plurality opinion
opinion
ignores the substantial
research
science research
substantial body of recent social science
demonstrating
resegregation, as
demonstrating the harms of racial isolation and resegregation,
25
diverse
racially
of
educational benefits of racially diverse schools.
well as the educational
schools. 25

b. Part
PartIV
b.
IV
Part IV is the most provocative
controversial section
provocative and controversial
section
Roberts' opinion, and it is extraordinary in its
of Chief Justice Roberts'
to refashion the legacy of Brown v. Board
Board of Education
Education
attempt to
as one of uncompromising
uncompromising colorblindness. It is not a novel claim
claim
23.

24.
25.

Id. at 2757 (quoting Grutter,
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
!d.
Id.
!d.
Id. at 2755.
!d.
2755.
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to assert that Brown's core norm is an anticlassification
anticlassification principle
that prohibits any differential treatment
treatment on the basis of race, but
but
such a claim has never enjoyed the support of a majority of the
Justices on the Supreme Court-and
Court-and it still does not. Nonetheless,
the Roberts plurality opinion is striking in its rhetoric
rhetoric and its
reinterpretation
reinterpretation of Brown, and even goes so far as to recast the
Brown litigators
litigators as champions
champions of absolute race-blindness.
race-blindness.
Proposing
assign
Proposing that "when it comes to using race to assign
26
children
Justice Roberts'
children to schools, history will be heard,
heard,"26 Chief
ChiefJustice
opinion ignores the decades-long
subordination
decades-long history of racial subordination
associated
associated with segregated
segregated schools and focuses instead on the
underlying harm
simple recognition of racial differences as the underlying
recognized
inequality of the facilities but
recognized in Brown: "It was not the inequality
the fact oflegally
of legally separating
which
separating children on the basis of race on which
the Court relied to find a constitutional
1954.27 And
constitutional violation in 1954."27
quoting Brown v.v. Board
II, the Court's 1955 opinion
Board ofEducation
ofEducation II,
opinion
segregation, the Roberts opinion further
on remedying
remedying school
school segregation,
states that Brown II "required
"required school districts 'to achieve a system
system
nonracial
of determining admission
admission to the public schools on a nonracial
'28
basis. "'28
basis.
In determining
determining which side is "more faithful to the heritage
of Brown," 29
29 the Roberts opinion goes on to quote the Brown
plaintiffs' brief,
"[t]he Fourteenth
brief, which states in part that "[t]he
Fourteenth
Amendment
differential treatment
treatment
Amendment prevents states from according differential
to American
American children
children on the basis of their color or race," and to
Robert L. Carter, who argued for
quote from the oral argument of Robert
26.

Id.
Id. at 2767.

27. Id.
Id
28. !d.
Id. (quoting Brown v.
v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294,
300-01
(1955)).
300-01 (1955)).
29.

Id.
Id
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the Brown plaintiffs in 1952, for the proposition that "no State has
equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth
any authority under the equal-protection

Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational
opportunities among its citizens."3o
citizens."30 Then, equating the Brown
opportunities
case with
with the Seattle and Louisville cases, the Chief Justice goes
case
on to ask, "[
"[w]
w] hat do the racial classifications do in these cases,
if not determine
determine admission to a public school on a racial basis?"
"[b] efore Brown,
Brown, schoolchildren
schoolchildren were told where
and then states, "[b]
they could and could not go to school based on the color of
of
their skin. The school districts in these cases have not carried the
demonstrating that we should allow this once
heavy burden of demonstrating
again-even for very different reasons."3!
reasons."31 Finally, the ChiefJustice
Chief Justice
statement: "The way to stop
closes his opinion with the following statement:
discrimination on the basis of race is stop discriminating on the
discrimination
race."32
basis of race."32

Responses
c.c.The Kennedy and Dissenters'
Dissenters' Responses
The remarkable
remarkable language in Parts 111-B
III - B and Part IV of the
Roberts
Roberts opinion led Justice
Justice Kennedy to disavow the plurality's
language
and analysis. As Justice
Justice Kennedy states early
early in his
language and
opinion:
"My views
views do not allow
opinion: "My
allow me to join the balance
balance of
of
the
opinion by The Chief Justice, which
the opinion
which seems
seems to me to be
inconsistent
in both
its approach
inconsistent in
both its
approach and its implications with the
history,
Clause."33
history, meaning,
meaning, and reach of the Equal Protection Clause."33
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy later states:
states: "parts of the opinion by The Chief
Chief
Justice imply
Justice
imply an
an all-too-unyielding
all-too-unyielding insistence
insistence that race
race cannot
cannot
30.
31.
31.

Id.
!d. at
at 2767-68.
2767-68.
Id.
Id. at
at 2768.

32.
32. Id.
!d.
33.
J., concurring
and concurring
concurring in the judg33. Id
Id. at
at 2788
2788 (Kennedy,
(Kennedy,].,
concurring in
in part
part and
ment).
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be a factor in instances
instances when, in my view, it may be taken into
opinion suggests the
account"34
"[tlo the extent the plurality opinion
account" 34 and "[t]o
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities
must accept the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in
35
mistaken."35
my view, profoundly mistaken."

Community
The dissenting opinions in Parents
Parents Involved in Community
Schools are even more critical of the plurality, with Justice Stevens
Chief Justice's reliance
stating that "[t]here
"[t]here is a cruel irony in The ChiefJustice's
on our decision in Brown v.
v. Board
Board of Education"
36 and that "[t]
Education"36
most
he Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this Court's most
37
important decisions."
decisions."3? Justice Breyer's lengthy dissenting opinion
opinion
excoriating language:
contains even more excoriating
[The plurality] distorts precedent, it misapplies the
constitutional principles, it announces legal
relevant constitutional
rules that will obstruct efforts by state and local
governments to deal effectively with the growing
growing
resegregation of public schools, it threatens to
substitute for present calm a disruptive round of racerelated litigation, and it undermines Brown's promise
of integrated primary and secondary
secondary education that
local communities
communities have sought to make a reality.
This cannot be justified
justified in the name of the Equal
38
Protection Clause.38

"[I]t is a cruel
Justice Breyer
Breyer goes on pointedly to state: "[I]t
compare Topeka, Kansas, in the 1950's to
distortion of history to compare
Louisville
of
Louisville and Seattle in the modern day-to equate the plight of
Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to
34.

Id.at 2791.
Id.
2791.

35. !d.
Id.
36.

J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2797 (Stevens, ).,

37.
38.

Id. at 2798.
Id.
2798.
!d. at 2800-01 (Breyer, J.,
)., dissenting).
Id.
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circumstances ofJoshua
of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer
the circumstances
39 The incidental
to a school closer
closer to home was initially declined)
declined)."."39
cost of using a race-based
race-based label in the Seattle and Louisville cases,
Justice Breyer adds, "does not approach, in degree or in kind, the
terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years
segregation."4 °
of legal racial segregation."40
consequences of Parents
Schools
The consequences
Parents Involved in Community Schools
would be even more far-reaching and disquieting if the plurality's
plurality's
Roberts opinion spoke for
arguments in Parts III-B and IV of the Roberts
the Court. They do not. Justice
Justice Kennedy's refusal to join these
sections
sections of the Roberts opinion tempers the impact of the case.
His opinion, along with Justice Breyer's dissent, sets a different
different
course for policy makers to follow in using race-conscious
measures
measures to address racial isolation and promote diversity in the
nation's public schools.

B. Justice
Kennedy's Opinion
Opinion
Justice Kennedy's
Justice Kennedy's concurring
concurring opinion
opinion explains
explains his reasons
reasons for
to invalidate the Seattle and Louisville plans. The opinion
voting to
confirms that he agrees with the Roberts plurality that "in the
context of these plans, the small number of assignments affected
affected
suggests that the schools
schools could have achieved their stated ends
through different means."41
means."41 Moreover, Justice Kennedy's opinion
offers his additional conclusions
conclusions that the plans failed narrow
tailoring
tailoring because they lacked precision and because
because the districts

39.

Id. at 2836.
!d.

40.

Id.
!d.
41. !d.
Id. at
2793 (Kennedy,
J., concurring
in part
part and
in the judg41.
at 2793
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring in
and concurring
concurring in
ment).
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articulate adequate
failed to articulate
adequate justifications
justifications for their specific racial
classifications.
classifications.

1. Narrow
Narrow Tailoring
Tailoringand the Seattle and
and Louisville
Louisville
1.
Plans
Plans
In criticizing the plans, the Kennedy opinion
opinion stresses that
"the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives demanded by
the
"the inquiry into less restrictive alternatives
narrow tailoring analysis requires in many cases a thorough
understanding
. . As part of [the
understanding of how a plan works .. .
government's burden] it must establish, in detail, how decisions
challenged
based on an individual student's race are made in a challenged
4
'
2
program. The Jefferson County Board of Education
Education failed, in
program."42
Justice Kennedy's opinion, to
to meet this basic mandate, because
the plan employed
cannot
employed "terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot
43
withstand
withstand strict scrutiny."
scrutiny."43
concluded that the Louisville plan failed
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy concluded
failed
"to make clear, for example, who makes the decisions;
"to make clear, for example, who makes the decisions; what if
any oversight is employed;
circumstances in which
which
employed; the precise circumstances
an assignment decision will or will not be made on the basis of
of
race; or how it is determined
determined which of two similarly
similarly situated
situated
44
children will be subjected
subjected to a given race-based decision.
decision."44
education affirmative
Although the Court's higher education
affirmative action cases
suggest that transparency
transparency in a selection
is
selection process employing
employing race is
not mandated
mandated by the Constitution,
Constitution, Justice Kennedy
Kennedy concluded
concluded
that the Louisville school board had failed to show that its racial
classification procedures
classification
procedures were narrowed to its specific
specific interests,

42.

Id.
Id. at
at 2789.

43.

Id. at 2790.
!d.
Id.
Id.

44.
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ad hoc manner
"rather than in the far-reaching, inconsistent, and ad
45
suggest."45
that a less forgiving reading of the record would suggest."
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's criticism of the Seattle plan, on the other
Justice
hand, focuses less on imprecision
imprecision than on the district's failure to
articulate adequate
adequate reasons for its racial classifications.
classifications. In particular,
categories of "white" and
the district's division of students into the categories
"non-white,"
according
to
Justice
Kennedy, constituted a "blunt
"non-white," according to Justice Kennedy,
"blunt
advance the goals of promoting
distinction" that did not clearly advance
student
diversity and reducing racial isolation, especially
especially with a student
population with significant numbers of blacks, Asian Americans,
Latinos, and Native Americans.
Americans. Discounting the argument that
minority populations
populations in Seattle have been subjected
subjected to similar
histories of discrimination
discrimination in education
education and housing, Justice
"[f] ar from being narrowly
narrowly tailored
tailored
Kennedy's opinion states that "[fJar
to its purposes, this system threatens
threatens to defeat its own ends, and
and
explanation for its
the school district has provided no convincing
convincing explanation
46
design."46
design."

Tailored Policies
and Race-Neutral
2. Narrowly
2.
Narrowly Tailored
Policies and
Alternatives
Alternatives
Although the Kennedy opinion concludes
concludes that the Seattle
and Louisville plans fail narrow tailoring analysis, Justice Kennedy
does provide three possibilities for upholding
upholding K-12 policies
policies that

address
address racial isolation
isolation or promote diversity.

45.

Id.
!d.

46.

Id.
at 2791.
Id. at
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a. "Last
"LastResort" Racial
Classifications
a.
Racial Classifications
First, Justice
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion indicates in general terms
classifications, if indeed
satisfy
indeed necessary, could satisfy
that some racial classifications,
scrutiny. His opinion concludes
strict scrutiny.
concludes that the Seattle and
Jefferson
education "failed
Jefferson County boards
boards of education
"failed to provide
provide the
avoid
support necessary" to show that there was no other way to avoid
racial isolation, but he nonetheless
nonetheless states that racial classifications
classifications
may be legitimate "if they are a last resort to achieve
achieve a compelling
47
interest."47
interest.
Given Justice Kennedy's specific criticisms of the Seattle
and Louisville plans, this suggests that he might be willing to
uphold race-conscious
race-conscious student assignment
assignment policies if they have
been thoroughly
thoroughly tested against race-neutral
race-neutral alternatives,
alternatives, if they
implementation process is fully
are sufficiently precise
precise and their implementation
explained, if they take into account the more nuanced racial and
and
ethnic compositions of the districts, and if they significantly
significantly affect
affect
of
compositions so that the goals of
student assignments and school compositions
the plan are clearly
clearly attained because
because of the assignments. Although
characteristics may be difficult to achieve, Justice Kennedy's
these characteristics
opinion
student
opinion does leave the door open to limited uses of race in student
assignments.

b. GrutterPolicies
b.
Grutter- Type
TJpe Policies
Second, Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion states that it is also
permissible to employ, "if necessary, a more nuanced, individual
evaluation of school needs and student characteristics
characteristics that
might include race as a component. [This] approach would be
informed
Grutter, though
though of course the criteria relevant to
informed by Grutter,
47.

Id. at
at 2792.
Id

HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 317 2008-2009

RUTGERS RACEAND
RACE AND LAWREVIEW
LAW REVIEW

318

Vol.
10:SE
Vol. 10:5E

placement would differ based on the age of the students,
student placement
the needs of the parents,
parents, and the role of the schools."48
schools."48 Although
guidance on what might
this passage does not provide precise guidance
constitute a narrowly tailored policy, it points to the higher
higher
constitute
Grutter v. Bollinger
education admissions
admissions procedures upheld in Grutter
education
Permissible programs might include, for
for
as a starting point. Permissible
example, a competitive
competitive admissions policy for a selective
selective college
preparatory high school that employs race as a "plus" factor among
preparatory
educational diversity within an
promote educational
other factors designed to promote
program would have direct parallels
parallels to
entering class. This type of program
Grutter.
the higher education
education admissions
admissions policies approved under Grutter.
What is not entirely clear, however, is how a Grutter-like
Grutter-like policypolicystudents-might be
individualized consideration
based on individualized
consideration of students-might
non-competitive procedures
implemented in non-competitive
implemented
procedures and across large
populations of students and schools.

ClassificationPolicies
Policies
c. NonNon-Classification
K-12
articulates a set of K-12
Third, Justice Kennedy's opinion
opinion articulates
educational policies that do not classify students
students by race and
educational
should not trigger strict scrutiny at all, even though they may
involve some attention to race. In one key passage, he states:
In the administration
administration of public schools by the state
and local
local authorities it is permissible
permissible to consider
consider the
general policies
racial makeup of schools and to adopt general
of
to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of
is
its
racial
composition.
If
school
authorities
which
which
student-body compositions
are concerned
concerned that the student-body
of certain
certain schools interfere
interfere with the objective of
of
educational opportunity
offering an equal educational
opportunity to all of
of
their students, they are free to devise race-conscious
48.

Id.
Id. at 2793.
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measures to address the problem in a general way and
without treating each student in different fashion
solely on the basis of a systematic, individual typing
by race.
School boards may pursue the goal of bringing
School
together students of diverse backgrounds and
races through other means, including strategic
strategic site
selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones
selection
general recognition
demographics of
of
with general
recognition of the demographics
neighborhoods;
neighborhoods; allocating resources for special
programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion; and tracking enrollments,
enrollments, performance,
performance,
and other statistics by race. These mechanisms
mechanisms are
race conscious
conscious but do not lead to
to different treatment
treatment
based on a classification
that
tells
each
classification
each student he
or she is to be defined by race, so it is unlikely any
of them would demand strict scrutiny
scrutiny to be found
49
49
permissible.
The examples
examples offered by Justice Kennedy are already
commonly used by school districts and include "magnet schools"
surrounding neighborhoods
order
that pull in students from surrounding
neighborhoods in order
to promote greater diversity and establishing
to
establishing school attendance
boundaries that cross
order
cross racially segregated
segregated neighborhoods
neighborhoods in order
to prevent
prevent racial isolation.

49. Id.
!d. at 2792 (citations omitted).
omitted). Justice
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion
opinion draws parallels
parallels
between
these
types
of
race-neutral
policies
of race-neutral policies and electoral
electoral districting, an
an area
area
between
in
Court has held that strict
automatically triggered
in which
which the
the Court
strict scrutiny
scrutiny is not
not automatically
triggered
unless
unless race
race is the predominant
predominant factor. Id.
Id.
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Interests: Kennedy and
C.
and Breyer
Compelling Interests:
C. Approving Compelling
Opinions
Opinions
Beyond the holding
holding of the Court, the multiple opinions
of the concurring
Justices in Parents
Parents Involved
concurring and dissenting Justices
in Community Schools indicate that school districts and other
governmental
race-conscious measures
governmental bodies can still employ race-conscious
if the underlying goals of the policy are designed to address
diversity. Taking the Kennedy and
segregation
promote diversity.
segregation and to promote
of
Breyer opinions together, it is clear that a five-member majority of
Breyer

endorses the compelling
compelling interests in
Supreme Court endorses
the current Supreme
educational diversity
avoiding racial isolation and in promoting educational
in K-12 education.

Interests in Avoiding
1. Kennedy Opinion:
1.
Opinion: Compelling
Compelling Interests
Diversity
Isolation and Promoting
Racial
Promoting Educational
Educational Diversity
Racial Isolation
Justice
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy declined
declined to join Part III-B of Chief Justice
Roberts'
Roberts' opinion, which focuses on the compelling interests of
of
the school districts in promoting diversity and avoiding racial
Roberts opinion. Early in his
isolation, as well as Part IV of the Roberts
opinion,
opinion, Justice Kennedy
Kennedy states: "The plurality opinion is too
government has in ensuring
dismissive
dismissive of the legitimate
legitimate interest government
. . . To the
all people have equal opportunity regardless of race ...
extent
extent the plurality opinion suggests
suggests the Constitution mandates
that state and local school
school authorities must accept the status
view, profoundly
quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view,
50
on
mistaken."
mistaken."5o He then makes clear that "[d]iversity, depending
depending on

50.

Id.
at 2791.
2791.
Id. at
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its
its meaning
meaning and
and definition,
definition, is aa compelling
compelling educational
educational goal
goal aa
school district
district may
may pursue."'"
pursue."51
school
Distinguishing the interests
interests asserted
asserted by
by the
the school
school districts
Distinguishing
as "racial
"racial
from an
an interest
interest characterized
characterized by
by the
the Roberts
Roberts plurality
plurality as
from
balancing," Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion
opinion makes clear
clear that
that he endorses
endorses
balancing,"
could justify
justify narrowly
narrowly
two closely
closely related
related compelling
compelling interests
interests that could
two
tailored race-conscious
race-conscious policies:
policies:
tailored

This
This Nation has a moral
moral and ethical obligation
obligation
to fulfill its historic commitment
commitment to creating
creating an
an
opportunity
equal
that
ensures
society
integrated society
integrated
ensures
for all of its children.
children. A compelling
compelling interest
interest exists
in avoiding
avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school
school
district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose
choose
to pursue. Likewise,
Likewise, a district may consider
consider it a
student
a
diverse
achieve
compelling interest to
compelling
student
component of that
population. Race may be one component
demographic factors, plus special
diversity, but other demographic
diversity,
considered.5522
talents and needs, should also be
be considered.
Justice Kennedy thus agrees with the Seattle and Louisville
isolation-which need
school districts that avoiding racial isolation-which
governmentnot be traced to intentional discrimination by governmentcan be a compelling governmental
governmental interest. He also distances
argument made by the Roberts plurality that
himself from an argument
segregation arising through intentional governmental
de jure segregation
discrimination
discrimination can be remedied through race-conscious measures
while de facto segregation (and resegregation) arising through
53
and private discrimination cannot.53
housing patterns and
51.
51.

52.

53.

Id. at 2789.
2789.
!d.
Id. at 2797.
Id
"The distinction between
Id
opinion states: "The
Justice Kennedy's opinion
2795. Justice
Id. at
at 2795.

as a hisamorphous both as
can be amorphous
furthermore, can
government
government and private action, furthermore,
Id.
of fact."
fact." Id
torical
as aa matter
matter of present-day finding of
and as
torical matter and
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Justice Kennedy additionally acknowledges that promoting
student body diversity in K-12 education can constitute a
compelling interest, but that interest is distinct from an interest in
compelling
racialdiversity alone. In other words, Justice Kennedy
promoting racial
endorses an interest in a broad form of educational diversity that
encompasses
encompasses multiple dimensions-one that includes, but is not
limited to, race, and that parallels the higher education diversity
interest upheld in Grutter
Grutterv. Bollinger.
Bollinger.And consistent with Grutter,
Grutter,
the interest in elementary
elementary and secondary
is
secondary educational
educational diversity is
one that can justify
consideration of race as a "plus" factor in
in
justifY the consideration
a multifactor selection or assignment process.

2. Breyer Opinion:
Interest in Racial
Opinion: A Compelling
Compelling Interest
Integration
Integration
Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which is joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens,
Stevens, draws an even closer linkage
between
between the Grutter
Grutter analysis and K-12 education, stating
stating that
"[i]
n light of this Court's conclusions in Grutter,
Grutter, the 'compelling'
'compelling'
"[i]n
nature
interests in the context of primary and secondary
secondary
nature of these interests
public
education follows here aafortiori.
public education
fortiori. Primary and secondary
secondary
schools are where
education of this Nation's children begins,
where the education
where
where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us
54 Although
to the end of our days."
vocabulary employed
days."54
Although the vocabulary
employed
by Justice
Justice Breyer to describe
describe the school districts' interests differs
somewhat from Justice
Justice Kennedy's characterization,
characterization, the core
interests
overlap and
and are
similarly compelling.
compelling. Justice
interests overlap
are similarly
Justice Breyer's
opinion goes to great lengths
"an
lengths to stress the importance
importance of "an
interest
in promoting
of
interest in
promoting or
or preserving
preserving greater
greater racial
racial 'integration'
'integration' of
public schools,"
schools," which
which he
he describes
describes as the "interest
"interest in eliminating
eliminating
54.

Id.
!d. at 2822
2822 (Breyer, J.,
]., dissenting).
dissenting).
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school-by-school racial isolation and increasing
increasing the degree to
school-by-school
characterizes each of the district's schools
which racial mixture
mixture characterizes
55
and each individual student's public school experience."
experience."55
Justice
Justice Breyer concludes
concludes that this interest encompasses (1) a
historical and remedial element-an
element-an interest in setting right the
consequences
elementsegregation, (2) an educational
educational elementconsequences of prior segregation,
an interest
interest in overcoming
overcoming the adverse effects associated with
highly segregated schools,
schools, and (3) a democratic
democratic element-an
interest in producing
educational environment
environment that reflects
producing an educational
opinion
that pluralistic society in which children will live. His opinion
states:
states:
The compelling
compelling interest
interest at issue here, then, includes
an effort
effort to eradicate
eradicate the remnants, not of general
'societal discrimination,'
and
"societal
discrimination," . . . but of primary and
segregation...;
effort
secondary school segregation
... ; it includes an effort
better
to create
create school environments
environments that provide better
educational opportunities for all children;
children; it includes
an effort
to
help
create
citizens
effort
citizens better prepared
prepared to
know, to understand, and to work with people of all
races and backgrounds, thereby furthering the kind
of democratic
government our Constitution foresees.
democratic government
If an educational
educational interest that combines these three
56
elements is not "compelling," what is?
is?56
Taken together, the Kennedy and Breyer opinions recognize
can
a compelling interest in addressing racial isolation that can
justify
justifY narrowly tailored race-conscious
race-conscious policies. Both opinions
also endorse a diversity interest, although Justice
Justice Breyer's "racial
integration" interest encompasses
encompasses the racial
racialdiversity interest that
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy takes care in his opinion to distinguish from a
broader educational
educational diversity interest. At the very least, however,
55. Id.
Id. at
at 2820.
56. Id. at
at 2823.

HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 323 2008-2009

324

RUTGERS
RACE AND LAW
LAW REVIEW
REVIEW
R UTGERS RACE

IO:SE
Vol. 10:5E

Grutter
language III
Breyer opinion that interprets the Grutter
in the Breyer
educational interest to be applicable to the K-12 arena afortiori
educational
a fortiori
implies that Justice Breyer
Breyer and the other dissenting
dissenting Justices
consider promoting
promoting educational diversity in K-12 education to
be a compelling
compelling interest as well.

D. Summary of Controlling
Controlling Principles
Principles
D.
With the division of the Justices in Parents
Parents Involved in
Schools, the controlling
entirely clear. The
controlling law is not entirely
Community Schools,
analysis in Chief Justice
Justice Roberts' opinion where he speaks for
the Court provides some key principles, but Justice Kennedy's
opinion may ultimately
ultimately offer the strict scrutiny guidelines that the
lower courts will follow in future litigation. His opinion
opinion provides
details on what may constitute narrowly tailored policies and
and
which types of educational
educational policies should not be subject to strict
compelling interest analysis, taken in
scrutiny at all; moreover, his compelling
tandem with Justice Breyer's
Breyer's opinion, provides the core argument
argument
compelling interests in avoiding racial isolation
for approving the compelling
and promoting
promoting educational diversity in K-12 education.

1. Strict
Strict Scrutiny
1.
Scrutiny Standard
Standard
The Roberts opinion for the Court makes clear that strict
scrutiny
assignment
scrutiny is the legal standard to be applied
applied to student assignment
policies
policies that employ race as a factor, and those types of plans
must be narrowly
governmental interest.
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental
The Roberts and Kennedy opinions also make clear that strict
scrutiny applies to voluntary race-conscious
race-conscious plans where there has
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The Court acknowledges
been no past de jure segregation.
segregation.5577 1he
acknowledges that
context does matter in strict scrutiny analysis, but in the context
context
classifications, the
of K-12 educational
educational policies involving racial classifications,
extended to higher
good-faith deference that the Court extended
type of good-faith
education institutions in Grutter
Grutterv. Bollinger
education
Bollinger does not apply.
Although the Court's reasons for invalidating the Seattle
and Louisville plans focus on specific problems with the plans,
voluntary race-conscious
race-conscious student assignment
assignment plans that are
similar to either of the plans are subject to strict scrutiny
scrutiny and are
to be unconstitutional.
likely to
unconstitutional. Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion suggests
carefully
that there may be very limited
limited circumstances
circumstances in which carefully
crafted racial classifications
classifications could satisfy strict scrutiny, if they
to achieving the goals of avoiding
are demonstrated
demonstrated to
to be essential to

57. Id.
!d. It is not clear how the Roberts
Roberts and Kennedy opinions will affect existsettlements or agreeing voluntary desegregation
desegregation plans made pursuant
pursuant to court settlements
Education's Office
ments with the Department
Department of Education's
Office for Civil Rights where there
has been no specific
specific finding or admission by the district of de jure segregation.
segregation.
The Roberts plurality
plurality opinion would seem to require strict scrutiny for all plans
with no prior showing of de jure segregation,
segregation, since Chief Justice Roberts gave
no weight to the past agreement
agreement between the Seattle district and the OCR as
at
a basis for justifying
justifying race-conscious
race-conscious remedies for de jure discrimination. Id.
!d. at
C.J.). Justice Kennedy's opinion also stresses
2761 n. 15 (opinion of Roberts, c.].).
the de jure-de facto distinction,
distinction, but his opinion indicates
indicates that voluntary desegregation would be distinct from the
segregation in response to past de jure segregation
Id. at 2795 (Kennedy, J.,
voluntary
voluntary plans at issue in Seattle
Seattle and Louisville. !d.
concurring in part and concurring
concurring in the judgment).
judgment). Thus, Justice Kennedy's
opinion suggests that voluntary
voluntary plans obtained
obtained through settlements or OCR
agreements
agreements might be insulated
insulated from strict scrutiny. Moreover, the Supreme
application of disparate impact standards to recipients
Court has upheld the application
recipients of
of
to
the
eliminafederal funding assistance "'to meet the special needs incident
incident
segregation and discrimination
tion of minority group segregation
discrimination among students and
and
schools,"' and "to
"to encourage
encourage 'the volunfaculty in elementary and secondary schools,'"
tary elimination, reduction, or prevention of minority group isolation' in such
.... "" Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 132 (1979) (upholding
schools ....
Emergency School Aid Act).
disparate impact standards
standards under Emergency
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racial isolation or promoting diversity and are demonstrated to be
compliant with other narrow tailoring requirements.

2. Compelling
CompellingInterests
Interests
2.
Only four members of the Court adopted the view that
the school districts' interests in addressing racial isolation
and promoting diversity, which the plurality recast as "racial
balancing," were not compelling. The remaining Justices would
would
futureuphold these interests as compelling if a case arose in the futureand if the Court retains its current membership. The Kennedy
and Breyer opinions taken together do not establish
establish a formal
holding of the Court, but they do provide a strong endorsement
endorsement
of two distinct compelling interests-avoiding
interests-avoiding racial isolation
isolation and
promoting
diversity-that school districts and other
promoting educational
educational diversity-that
governmental bodies can employ to defend their race-conscious
governmental
policies and that the lower courts can accept in future litigation.

3. Narrow
Tailoring
Narrow Tailoring
In
In speaking
speaking for the Court, the Roberts opinion
opinion provides
only the
the most basic
only
basic guidance on narrow tailoring, and the Court's
inquiries in
Parents Involved in Community Schools are highly
inquiries
in Parents
specific to
Seattle and Louisville
Louisville plans. At a minimum, school
school
specific
to the
the Seattle
districts
employing
race-conscious
assignment policies
districts employing race-conscious assignment
policies must
must
have carefully
carefully explored
have
explored race-neutral
race-neutral alternative
alternative policies and must
must
demonstrate
race-conscious plans. What
What would
would
demonstrate the
the necessity
necessity of race-conscious
satisfy
a
necessity
inquiry,
however,
is
not
not entirely
entirely clear. A raceracesatisfy a necessity
conscious
impact on advancing
conscious plan
plan must
must have
have aa significant
significant impact
advancing the
school
cannot be tied solely
solely to
to the racial
school district's
district's interests,
interests, and cannot
demographics
demographics of
of the
the district.
district. Language
Language in Justice
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy opinion
opinion
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suggests that
that race-conscious
race-conscious plans
plans should
should be
be precisely
precisely
further suggests
and be
be transparent
transparent in their implementation,
implementation, and that the
written and
nuances of the
the school
school district's
district's population-specifically,
population-specifically, relevant
relevant
nuances
ethnic groups-must
groups-must be taken
taken into
differences among
among racial
racial and ethnic
differences
account.
account.

K-12 Educational Policies and Racial
Racial
IL K-12
Integration: Navigating the Waters
\.Vaters
Parents Involved in Community
Community
The Court's rulings in Parents
invalidating the
Schools had the immediate
consequence of invalidating
the plans
immediate consequence
58 Student assignment plans in other
and Louisville.58
Student assignment plans
other
in Seattle and
classifications and
and
communities that employ
employ comparable
comparable racial classifications
do not address the narrow tailoring
tailoring concerns
concerns of the Court and
and
Parents Involved in Community Schools are
Justice Kennedy in Parents
completely
most likely unconstitutional
unconstitutional as well. The rulings do not completely
racial classifications,
classifications, but if Justice
Justice Kennedy's
foreclose the use of racial
classifications
admonitions are to be heeded, employing
employing racial classifications
without
individualized consideration
consideration in assigning
assigning
without some degree of individualized
students must be a policy of final resort. School districts that
to
choose to maintain racial classification systems must be able to
Court
answer each of the narrow tailoring concerns raised by the Court
problematic for
and by Justice Kennedy, which may be highly problematic
many districts.
What, then, has the Supreme Court left school districts
to employ as constitutionally permissible policies? Five Justices
would uphold the interests in avoiding racial isolation and
58. The decision has also cast doubt on an earlier federal
federal court of appeals
comparable student assignment policies in Lynn, Masdecision that upheld comparable
E3d lOst
1 (1st Cir.) (en banc),
v. Lynn School Comm.,
sachusetts. Comfort v.
Comm., 418 F.3d
bane),
denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
cert. denied,
cert.
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promoting educational
educational diversity,
diversity, and nothing in the Kennedy or
Breyer opinions suggests
suggests that school districts must individually
document
document these interests through a strong basis in evidence in
order to satisfy constitutional
constitutional standards. Instead, the means
employed to advance those compelling interests will be central
to determining whether school district policies
policies are constitutional.
If avoiding
avoiding racial isolation and promoting
promoting educational diversity
are compelling
compelling interests
interests that can justify a variety of policies,
school districts must employ policies that are either (1)
(1) raceneutral or (2) race-conscious
race-conscious and compliant with narrow tailoring
requirements.
Using Justice
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's concurring
concurring opinion as a starting
point, there are three sets of potential policies that school districts
might adopt:
•*

"race-neutral" or "race-aware"
"race-neutral"
"race-aware" policies that may
take into account race but do not employ racial
classifications
•• Grutter-style
Grutter-style assignment policies that employ
student
several factors in making student
race as one of several
assignments
a• racial
racial classifications
classifications that
are oflast
of last resort and can
that are
satisfy narrow tailoring
tailoring
As Justice
of
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion
opinion indicates, the likelihood of
unconstitutionality increases as school districts move from raceunconstitutionality
neutral
neutral policies to race-as-plus-factor
race-as-plus-factor policies that employ race
in
process of
of individualized
individualized consideration,
in aa process
consideration, and policies will
be presumptively
unconstitutional if they employ explicit racial
presumptively unconstitutional
classifications
classifications in individual
individual student assignments. The bottom line
is that school districts must reexamine
reexamine their current
current policies in
Parents Involved in Community Schools,
Schools, and they should
should
light of Parents
be prepared to engage
engage in creative policy making that stays within
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constitutional limits but
but advances
advances the
the goals
goals of educational
educational
constitutional
and avoiding
avoiding racial
racial isolation.
isolation.
diversity and
diversity

A. Race-Neutral
Race-Neutral and Race-Aware
Race-Aware Policies
Policies
A.
Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's opinion
opinion offers
offers the following
following nonnonJustice
exhaustive
policies that may
may take race into
into account
account but
but do
exhaustive list of policies
classify students
students by race:
not classify

*•

strategic
strategic site selection
selection of new schools

•

drawing
drawing attendance
attendance zones with
with general
of
demographics
of
the
recognition
of
demographics
of
recognition
neighborhoods

*•

allocating resources for special programs
allocating

*•

targeted
recruiting
recruiting students and faculty in a targeted
fashion
fashion

*•

tracking
other
tracking enrollments,
enrollments, performance,
performance, and other
statistics by race

These policies
policies typify programs in which school districts
demographics, patterns of housing
can be mindful of racial demographics,
segregation, and student enrollment
enrollment statistics, but do not
employ racial classifications on their face. Other race-neutral or
race-aware policies not mentioned by Justice Kennedy do exist.
For instance, many school districts have employed, with some
measure of success, student assignment policies that use criteria
diversity, because
to promote racial diversity,
socioeconomic status to
such as socioeconomic

race. Another type of raceclosely correlate with race.
these criteria can closely
these
neutral policy isis a lottery or randomized assignment system that
may result in assignments and student bodies that parallel districtwide demographics.
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Independent
Independent of their actual effectiveness,
effectiveness, race-neutral
race-neutral or raceaware policies should satisfy constitutional
constitutional requirements because
because
they do not employ racial classifications
classifications and do not allocate
burdens on the basis of race; they are therefore unlikely
benefits or burdens
to trigger strict scrutiny in the first place. However, districts must
Protection
also be careful not to overstep the bounds of the Equal Protection
Clause by considering
considering or weighing
weighing race too heavily. For instance,
legislative districting
the Supreme
Supreme Court's recent case law on legislative
establishes a trigger for strict scrutiny
scrutiny whenever
whenever race is used as the
59
predominant
Although the law
predominant factor in drawing district lines.59
electoral districting
of electoral
districting has not been transplanted to school district
attendance zones with race as the
line drawing, creating
creating school attendance
predominant
predominant factor might subject a policy to strict scrutiny;
scrutiny; while
this does not mean that a policy would be unconstitutional,
unconstitutional, it
could be subject to heightened review by the courts if challenged
challenged
in litigation.

B. Race-as-Plus-Factor
Race-as-Plus-Factor Policies
Policies
Justice Kennedy's opinion
opinion does not provide detailed
detailed guidance
on what might be a Grutter-like
Grutter-like policy employing individualized
individualized
consideration
elementary and secondary
consideration of students at the elementary
school levels. His opinion states that "a district may consider
consider it a
compelling
compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. Race
may be one component
component of that diversity, but other demographic
factors, plus special
special talents and needs, should also be considered."
considered."60°
A clear parallel to admissions in higher education is admission to
a K-12 school or program with a competitive
processcompetitive selection
selection processfor example, an elite college
college preparatory high school-in
school-in which
59.
60.

See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
(1995).
Parents
Parents Involved in Cmty
Cmty. Sch., 127
127 S. Ct. at 2797.
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extracurricular activities,
factors such as grades, test scores, extracurricular
activItIes,
socioeconomic status could be taken into account,
residency, and socioeconomic
along with a student's race or ethnicity, in order to select a student
student
body. However, it is more difficult to envision a holistic, racebody.
as-plus-factor
as-plus-factor policy involving a large number of students across
multiple schools
schools and programs.
Lessons learned in higher
higher education admissions
admissions suggest that
there are procedures
procedures in which multiple criteria
criteria can be considered
considered
decisions, including admissions policies used
used
in making selection
selection decisions,
at some of the largest public universities. These types of policies,
individualized
where race is used as a plus factor along with other individualized
transfer
factors, could be adapted to apply to enrollment
enrollment and transfer
K- 12 grade levels. While the design and
decisions
and
decisions at the K-12
demographically
implementation
implementation of these policies in populous
populous and demographically
diverse school districts might be challenging, they are not
insurmountable.
insurmountable. For example, the controlled
controlled choice policy struck
down in the Seattle school district attempted
attempted to employ race as
one of a series of tiebreakers
tiebreakers (along with residency
residency and sibling
constitutionally
status) to determine high school assignments. A constitutionally
residency, sibling status, and
compliant policy might employ race, residency,
compliant
and
determine whether an individual
a range of additional factors to determine
particular school.
student should be assigned
assigned to a particular
There are, of course, many questions left to be answered.
For example, what additional criteria should be included in
determinations affecting student assignments?
individualized determinations
individualized
assignments? Do
these criteria
criteria vary by a student's
student's age or grade level?
level? May numerical
or
goals and ranges still be employed to address racial isolation or
to promote diversity? If so, how do the specific racial and ethnic

demographics
demographics within a district affect those goals? Some of these
answered as school districts take steps to
questions may only be answered
policies, and the legality
revise their policies and develop new policies,
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of some programs
programs may ultimately have to be tested through
litigation.

C.
Racial Classifications
C. Last-Resort Racial
Classifications
The Kennedy opinion still leaves the door open for
for
limited uses of racial classifications
Grutterclassifications that do not employ Grutterstyle procedures, but stresses that there must be a very strong
demonstration
necessity before they can be upheld: there must
demonstration of necessity
be "some extraordinary
other
extraordinary showing"61
showing"" of need and "measures other
than differential
differential treatment
treatment based on racial typing of individuals
first must be exhausted."62
exhausted. ' 2 This language
language suggests that alternative
policies not only need to be seriously
seriously considered, they may have to
to
be employed and proved unsuccessful before a racial classification
classification
especially heavy burden on school
system can be attempted-an
attempted-an especially
districts.

Based on Justice Kennedy's
Kennedy's criticisms of the Seattle and
and
Louisville plans, a race-conscious
race-conscious plan would have to have a welldocumented
advancing the school district's interests in
in
documented impact on advancing
addressing racial isolation and promoting diversity, but not be so
so
inflexible or burdensome on students that it would violate other
narrow tailoring concerns.
concerns. The racial demographics of the district,
including
including relevant differences
differences among racial and ethnic groups,
would have to
to be taken into account, but not used merely to set
goals of racial proportionality. Racial classification
classification plans must also
also
goals
be
precisely written and be transparent
implementation.
be precisely
transparent in their implementation.

61. !d.
Id. at
at 2796
concurring in
and concurring
concurring in the judg61.
2796 (Kennedy,
(Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and
ment).

62.

Id. at 2797.
[d.
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The door has not been slammed shut on racial classifications
in K-12 education, but Justice Kennedy's standards are very
very
difficult to satisfy.

IlL
III.Impact on Equal Protection Doctrine
conjunction with other recent Supreme
When examined in conjunction
circumscribing the boundaries of race-conscious
Court cases circumscribing
affirmative action,63
action, 63 electoral
electoral districting designed to promote
affirmative
crafted
desegregation policies crafted
rights, 64 and desegregation
minority voting rights,64
Board of Education,
to enforce the mandates of Brown v.v. Board
Education,65
65 the
Schools is not altogether
altogether
outcome in Parents
ParentsInvolved in Community Schools
outcome
surprising. The Court's recent equal protection
protection jurisprudence
jurisprudence has
race-conscious policy making, and
become
and
become increasingly hostile to race-conscious
a majority of the current Court is deeply skeptical of policies that
employ
employ race, even those that advance important social goals such
such
as integrated public education.
Perhaps
and
Perhaps the most disturbing
disturbing aspect of the Seattle and
Louisville
Louisville cases is that several members of the Court have called
called
interpretation of Brown, with members
into question the basic interpretation
of the Roberts plurality arguing for an entirely
entirely color-blind
color-blind
interpretation
and
interpretation of Brown and the Equal Protection Clause, and
"[t]he way to stop discrimination
going so far as to propose that "[t]he
discrimination
66
on the basis of race is stop discriminating
discriminating on the basis of race.
race."66
reinterpretation
Justice Kennedy's opinion tempers that extreme
extreme reinterpretation
of
Pefia, 515 U.S. 200 (1995);
63. See Adarand Constructors,
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
(1995); City of
(1989).
v. J.A. Croson Co.,
Richmond v.
Richmond
Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
630
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
64. See Miller v.
(1995); Shaw v.
(1993).
(1993).
(1992); Board of Educ. of Okla. City
65. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992);
498
U.S.
237
(1991).
v. Dowell,
Pub. Sch. v.
Dowell,
(1991).
66.

C.J.).
S. Ct. at 2768 (Roberts, c.].).
ParentsInvolved in Cnty
Parents
Cmty. Sch., 127
127 S.
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of the
the Constitution,
Constitution, bur
but there is still aa majority
majority on the
of
the current
to limit-if
limit-if not eliminate-many
Court that is inclined to
eliminate-many raceconscious policies that
that are designed
designed to
to promote equal
equal opportunity.
opportunity.
conscious
The rulings in the Seattle
Seattle and
and Louisville cases have broader
broader
for equal protection doctrine, race-conscious
race-conscious policy
implications for
making, and civil rights litigation, which include some of the
following concerns:
following

A. Limiting
Limiting Grutter v. Bollinger
Bollinger
Grutter v.v. Bollinger
Bollinger
While all of the Justices recognized that Grutter
is good law and a viable precedent, the Parents
Parents Involved in
Community Schools majority compartmentalized
Grutter in
compartmentalized Grutter
applicability outside of higher
significant ways that may limit its applicability
education. Dismissing any parallels
parallels in context between higher
education and K-12 education, the majority
majority declared
declared that "[t]he
"[t]he
education
6
7
present cases are not governed
Chief Justice
governed by Grutter.
Grutter."67 Indeed, ChiefJustice
present
Roberts not only distinguished Grutter's
Grutter'shigher education context
context
from elementary
elementary and secondary
secondary education, he argued that higher
education
unique context. Writing for the Court, he stated:
education is a unique
In upholding the admissions
admissions plan
plan in Grutter..
Grutter . .
relied upon considerations
. this
this Court
Court relied
considerations unique
to
institutions
of
higher
education,
noting that
to institutions of higher education, noting
in
light
of
"the
expansive
freedoms
of
speech
in light of "the expansive
speech and
and
thought
associated
with
the
university
environment,
thought associated with the university environment,
universities
uniVerSItieS occupy
occupy a special
special niche
niche in our
constitutional
constitutional tradition."
tradition." The
The Court
Court explained
explained that
that
"[ciontext
matters"
in
"[c]ontext
in applying
applying strict
strict scrutiny, and
and
repeatedly
noted
that
it
was
addressing
the
use
of
repeatedly noted that it was addressing the use of
68
race
"in
the
context
of
higher
education."
race "in the context higher education."68
67.

Id.
Id. at
at 2754.
2754.

68.

Id.
!d. (citations
(citations omitted).

HeinOnline -- 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 334 2008-2009

VOLUNTARY SCHOOL INTEGRATION
INTEGRATION POLICIES
POLICIES
VOLUNTARY

2008
2008

335

expressly
The Chief
ChiefJustice
continued: "The
"The Court
Court in Grutter
Grutterexpressly
Justice continued:
The
articulated key limitations
limitations on
on its holding--defining
holding-defining aa specific
specific type
type
articulated
broad-based diversity
diversity and noting the unique context
context of higher
higher
of broad-based
education-but these limitations
limitations were
were disregarded
disregarded by
by the lower
lower
education-but
Grutter to uphold race-based
race-based assignments
assignments in
courts in extending
extending Grutter
courts
6
9
concluded that
elementary and secondary
secondary schools."69
schools." He then concluded
elementary
7°
Grutter did not
not apply at all to the Seattle
Seattle and Louisville
Louisville cases.
casesJo
Grutter
education admissions
By portraying
portraying higher education
admissions as sui generis,
generis,
Chief Justice
Justice Roberts'
Roberts' opinion leaves
leaves little
little doubt
doubt that
that he is
attempting to confine
confine Grutter's
Grutter's value
value as a precedent-not
precedent-not only
for K-12 education
education but for other settings where race-conscious
policies
rely
policies are in use. Both Justice
Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer rely
recognition of diversity
on Grutter
large part to defend their recognition
diversity as
Grutterin large
Chief
a compelling
compelling interest in K-12 education, so the language in Chief
practical terms by the
undermined in practical
Justice Roberts' opinion is undermined
other Justices' opinions.
opinions. Nonetheless,
Nonetheless, language
language in the Roberts
Parents Involved in Community Schools may lead other
other
opinion in Parents
courts to
to discount
discount Grutter
Grutter as an applicable precedent
precedent in key areas
employment in the public
education, such as employment
outside of higher education,
71
diversity-based
where diversity-based
governmental jobs,
schools and other governmental
jobs,?!
policies
policies have been deployed.

69.

Id.
Id.

70.

Id.
See Id.

on
71. A discussion of the impact of Parents
71.
Parents Involved in Community Schools on
privatethat
affect
laws
and
other
Act
of
1964
Rights
of
the
Civil
Title
VII
Tide
sector employment is beyond the scope of this analysis. The law governing
race-conscious affirmative action in private employment
race-conscious
employment differs in important
ways from the Court's equal protection jurisprudence on affirmative action,
Parents Involved in Community Schools may ultimately
but the reasoning
reasoning in Parents
have significant effects on how the courts evaluate diversity-based
diversity-based programs
interests in other sectors.
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B. Context
Context and
andStrict
Strict Scrutiny
Scrutiny Analysis
Analysis
B.
In upholding the University
University of Michigan's law
law school
policy, the Grutter
Grutter Court stated that "[cJontext
"[clontext
admissions policy,
strict scrutiny; moreover, the Court ruled,
matters" in applying strict
ruled,
"[n]ot every decision influenced
influenced by race is equally objectionable,
objectionable,
"[nJot
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for
and strict scrutiny
and sincerity of the reasons
carefully examining the importance and
advanced by the governmental decisionmaker
decisionmaker for the use of
of
2
race in that particular
particular context."~2
context." Because Grutter
Grutter arose in the
First
context of higher education, where academic freedom and First
Amendment considerations
considerations were also implicated, the Court
Amendment
employed a careful, but less searching
searching review under strict scrutiny
and deferred
deferred in important ways to institutions of higher learning.
The Grutter
GrutterCourt did not, for example, require a strong basis in
evidence for universities to justify their interest in diversity, and
compliance in a number of its
presumed good-faith compliance
the Court presumed
narrow tailoring inquiries.
Schools
Parents Involved in Community Schools
The Court in Parents
distinguished higher education
education from K-12 education,
education, and
and
employed
a
strict
scrutiny standard
standard that offered no deference
employed a strict scrutiny
to the
Consequently, the Court's review was
to
the school
school districts.
districts. Consequently,
considerably
skeptical than the
considerably more
more skeptical
the standard
standard adopted in Grutter.
Grutter.
For
instance,
For instance, the
the majority
majority did not accept
accept the good-faith
good-faith attempts
of
of the
the Seattle
Seattle school
school district
district to consider race-neutral
race-neutral alternatives,
alternatives,
and
history of past desegregation
desegregation efforts
efforts in
and ignored
ignored the
the lengthy
lengthy history
both
both Seattle
Seattle and
and Louisville
Louisville that could
could help establish
establish the
the context
context
in which
which the policies
policies arose.
arose.
Part
Part IV
IV of
of Chief
Chief Justice
Justice Roberts'
Roberts' plurality
plurality opinion
opmlOn is
emphatic
emphatic in
in its
its rejection
rejection of
of aa relaxed
relaxed strict
strict scrutiny, proposing
proposing
72.
72.

Grutter,
Grutter, 539
539 U.S.
U.S. at
at 327.
327.
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that earlier cases "reject the argument that motives affect the strict
strict
"is
scrutiny analysis" and that deference
deference to local school boards "is
73
jurisprudence."
fundamentally at odds with our equal protection jurisprudence."73
is thus in direct opposition
opposition to Justice Breyer's
His opinion is
where he
contextual approach to the Seattle and Louisville plans, where
and the other dissenting Justices would have employed a careful
but more relaxed scrutiny to uphold the plans. Justice Breyer's
analysis takes into account both the motives of the policy makers
deference to local governmental
and the courts' traditional deference
characterized Roberts'
decision making. Justice Breyer accordingly characterized
standard of review as one that is "fatal in fact across the board."74
board. 74
By failing to extend a contextual
contextual analysis to the school
school
districts' policies in Parents
Parents Involved in Community Schools-what
Justice Stevens described in his dissent as "a wooden reading of the
Clause" 7 5-the majority
revealed its cynicism
majority revealed
cynicism
Equal Protection Clause"75-the
toward race-conscious
modify
unwillingness to modify
race-conscious policies and its unwillingness
strict scrutiny in order to take into account
account important factual
and institutional
context
institutional differences. The Court did not say that context
effectively confined
confined
should never matter, which would have effectively
Grutter itself,
contextual deference to Grutter
itself, but the Court offered no
guidance on when and how context
context should make a difference in
the future.

C.
Tailoringand
and Race-Neutral
C. Narrow
Narrow Tailoring
Race-Neutral Alternatives
Alternatives
Neither Chief Justice Roberts'
Roberts' plurality opinion
opinion nor
Justice Kennedy's
Parents Involved in Community
Community
Kennedy's opinion in Parents
changes the law of narrow tailoring. Yet, their
Schools radically changes
73.

ParentsInvolved in emty.
Cnty. Sch.,
S. Ct. at 2764,2766.
2764, 2766.
Parents
Sch., 127 S.

74.

Id. at 2817 (Breyer, ].,
J., dissenting).
Id.

75.

Id. at 2798 (Stevens, J.,
Id
]., dissenting).
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inqUInes under
under narrow tailoring
tailoring reflect
reflect an opposition
opposition to
to racial
inquiries
that may
may make future
future inquiries
inquiries especially
especially rigorous.
rigorous.
classifications that
classifications
In writing for the
the Court, Chief
Chief Justice
Justice Roberts'
Roberts' narrow
narrow tailoring
tailoring
In
whether the
the policies
policies were necessary
necessary
analysis focused
focused heavily
heavily on whether
analysis
In assessing the
the necessity
necessity of
of
to advance
advance aa compelling
compelling interest.
interest. In
to
the plans,
plans, Chief Justice Roberts
Roberts approached
approached the inquiry
inquiry in a
backhanded way: he inferred
inferred that they were
were not
not necessary
necessary because
backhanded
employed race
race ineffectively
ineffectively and
and the objectives
objectives of the policy
they employed
could have
have been accomplished
accomplished through
through other
other means. Similarly,
could
of
Justice Kennedy
Kennedy criticized
criticized the Louisville
Louisville plan for its lack
lack of
Justice
precision and transparency
transparency in making
making race-conscious
race-conscious decisions.
decisions.
precision
order to be consistent
consistent with case
case law
law such as Grutter,
Grutter, the
Yet, in order
order
districts' plans intentionally
down played race
race as a factor in order
intentionally downplayed
districts'
not
to comply with the requirements that they be flexible and not
non-minority students. In the future, navigating
navigating
unduly burden non-minority
unduly
limited burdens
burdens on the one
safe waters
waters between
between flexibility and limited
necessity on the other hand may prove
effectiveness and necessity
hand and effectiveness
comply with
with
to be hazardous for policy makers attempting to comply
narrow tailoring.
Although Justice Kennedy's opinion offers a number
number of racerace-conscious policies that that he might uphold as
neutral and race-conscious
constitutional, his narrow tailoring analysis in Parents
Parents Involved
in Community Schools is exacting and implies that he may only
accept overt racial classifications when there is an extraordinary
showing of need. Justice Kennedy may insist in the future that
race-conscious policies can be employed, "measures other
before race-conscious
than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals

language suggests that policy
76 This language
first must be exhausted." 76
makers may only be able to employ explicitly race-conscious
the judgin the
and concurring
concurring in part and
Id. at 2797 (Kennedy, J., concurring
76. !d.
concurring in
judgment).
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attempted race-neutral
policies after they have already attempted
race-neutral policies,
significantly higher burden than merely having to go
which is a significantly
through a good-faith consideration of race-neutral
race-neutral policies. Both
Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Roberts have elevated the role
of race-neutral alternatives as a means for striking down racial
classifications, and their standards, if adopted in later cases, may
classifications,
prove to be unreachable by many policy makers.

Conclusion
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's ruling in Parents
Involvedin
Community
Parents Involved
in Community
Schools marks a major shift in its equal protection
protection jurisprudence
educational opportunity.
and its dedication to defending
defending equal educational
The case demonstrates
demonstrates that the Court, like the American public,
remains deeply
deeply divided on questions of race and race-conscious
policy making. Thus even today,
today, over fifty years after the Court's
Court's
ruling in Brown
Brown v.v. Board
Board of Education,
of
Education, the goals and methods of
achieving
achieving equality espoused in Brown are still hotly contested. The
impact
of the
the Seattle
Seattle and
and Louisville
Louisville cases on school assignment
assignment
impact of
policies
be significant,
case
policies will
will be
significant, but the legal mandates of the case
do not foreclose creative and dedicated
dedicated policy
policy making designed
designed
to
promote
diversity
and
to
avoid
to promote
racial isolation
isolation in the nation's
schools. Nothing
Nothing in the Court's decision should diminish the
schools.
integration ideal
ideal implicit in Brown. The
The Seattle
Seattle and Louisville
Louisville
integration
cases
should
instead
provide
the
public
and
government
cases should instead provide the public
government at all
levels
with a strong impetus
levels with
impetus to further advance
advance equality and to
promote
educational opportunities
promote educational
opportunities within the
the bounds
bounds of the
Constitution.
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